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ABSTRACT 
Environmental remediation efforts that are underway at hundreds of contaminated sites in the 
United States will not be able to remediate large portions of those sites to conditions that would 
permit unrestricted access. Rather, large volumes of waste materials, contaminated soils and 
cleanup residuals will have to be isolated either in place or in new, often on-site, disposal cells 
with long term monitoring, maintenance and institutional control needs. The challenge continues 
to be to provide engineering systems and controls that can ensure the protection of public health 
and the environment over very long time horizons (hundreds to perhaps thousands of years) with 
minimal intervention. 
Effective long term management of legacy hazardous and nuclear waste requires an integrated 
approach that addresses both the engineered containment and control system itself and the 
institutional controls and other responsibilities that are needed. Decisions concerning system 
design, monitoring and maintenance, and the institutional controls that will be employed are best 
done through a "risk-informed, performance-based" approach. Such an approach should 
incorporate an analysis of potential "failure" modes and consequences for all important system 
features, together with lessons learned from experience with systems already in place. 
The authors will present the preliminary results of a case study approach that included several 
sites where contamination isolation systems including institutional controls have been 
implemented. The results are being used together with failure trees and logic diagrams that have 
been developed for both the engineered barriers and the institutional controls. The use of these 
analytical tools to evaluate the potential for different levels of failure and associated 
consequences will be discussed. Of special interest is the robustness of different approaches to 
providing long-term protection through redundancy and defense in depth. 
INTRODUCTION 
Technical and economic limitations associated with the inability to destroy various waste 
constituents have resulted in large volumes of hazardous, radioactive and other contaminated 
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materials being isolated on-site in engineered containment systems. The time horizons over 
which these engineered contaminant isolation facilities (CIFs) must perform ranges from 
hundreds to, perhaps, thousands of years due to the long-lived nature of the contaminants [1].  
The objective of effective containment is the prevention of adverse consequences, which may 
result from either migration of contaminants from the CIF to human and/or environmental 
receptors or intrusion into the contained materials. Consequently, we seek robust engineered 
system designs that can perform over long time periods with minimal intervention, together with 
effective approaches to institutional controls and long-term monitoring and maintenance. 
In this paper, we report the preliminary results of a case study approach using previously closed 
sites. The case study selection criteria and lessons learned are discussed. Our ultimate goal is the 
development of an analytical framework that will permit questions concerning long-term 
performance, monitoring and the potential need for intervention to be evaluated in advance of 
final system design. 
CONTAMINANT ISOLATION FACILITIES (CIF) 
Contamination isolation can be performed through an in-situ approach that uses surface and 
subsurface barriers to prevent release and migration or through excavation of the material and 
emplacement in a new disposal cell, constructed with both a bottom liner system and a surface 
cover.
The primary objective of an engineered cover is to prevent potentially infiltrating rainwater from 
leaching contaminants and facilitating their transport through groundwater to potential receptors. 
The design approach to engineered covers has evolved over the years as information and 
experience were obtained. The current approach features a primary barrier of natural and/or 
synthetic materials to prevent infiltration. Other components are typically placed above the 
primary barrier to provide drainage, prevent biointrusion, and support vegetation. Depending 
upon the regulations driving the cleanup [e.g., CERCLA, RCRA, UMTRCA or the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's License Termination Rule (LTR)], the design may be prescriptive or 
"performance-based" [2-4]. 
The anticipated long-term performance of an engineered CIF is dependent upon the effectiveness 
and robustness of both the engineered containment facility itself and the institutional controls 
and other needed institutional responsibilities, such as monitoring and maintenance. The 
engineered system design has the objective of preventing the release and subsequent migration of 
hazardous constituents to human and environmental receptors, while the institutional controls 
have the design objective of influencing human behavior so as to keep them from contacting the 
hazardous constituents. 
A CASE STUDY APPROACH TO PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
This research utilized a case study approach to investigate the performance of existing CIFs. 
Case studies have been shown to be a valuable research methodology. The case study approach 
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can offer several advantages over other research techniques [5-8]. With respect to our objective 
of evaluating potential long-term CIF performance, the key advantages are that case studies: 
x Can provide insight into the dynamics of a complex situation, 
x Have been successful in tackling questions of "why" and "how", 
x Provide the investigator an ability to retain a holistic view of individual cases while 
retaining the flexibility to explore embedded units of analysis across cases, and 
x Can provide an all-inclusive approach including both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence. 
Case studies do not represent a sample of a population, but rather, they are a form of empirical 
inquiry useful in generalizing and expanding a theory or hypothesis [7]. 
Cases were selected with the following characteristics: 
x Operations/Remedial Action phases were completed, 
x Known, persistent (i.e. half-lives > 100 years) contaminated material remains on-site 
in the shallow subsurface (i.e. in the top 10 meters of the earth’s surface), 
x Engineered and Institutional Controls are included in the remediation action,  
x System performance information is available, and 
x Regulatory structure is defined e.g., CERCLA, UMTRCA. 
This research selected and investigated a number of sites as case studies. A primary regulation 
governing the management of residual contaminants is CERCLA. Therefore, CERCLA-
applicable sites were a major source of potential case studies. Three of the investigated case 
studies were Love Canal, Maxey Flats and the Anaconda/Old Works Smelter Site. Table I 
provides a regulatory summary of these sites. 
Table I. Regulatory Summary of Three Selected Case Studies 
Case Regulatory 
Driver 
Federal 
Regulatory
Agency 
Primary 
Responsible
Party 
Regulatory
Actions 
Anaconda CERCLA USEPA ARCO 1987, 1991, & 
1994 RODs 
Love Canal CERCLA USEPA Occidental 1985, 1988 & 
1991 RODs 
Maxey Flats CERCLA USEPA USDOE 1991 ROD 
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Love Canal 
The Love Canal site gained national notoriety in the late 1970’s and is often recognized as a 
major contributor to the creation of CERCLA. The original Love Canal property was used by the 
Hooker Electrochemical Company (now Occidental), and possibly others, for chemical waste 
disposal from 1942 through 1953 [9]. The EPA estimates that approximately 21,000 tons of 
chemicals were disposed of in the canal [10]. Following World War II, a population growth 
spurred the housing market in the Niagara Falls area. In 1953, the entire Love Canal property 
was transferred to the Niagara Falls Board of Education for $1[11-14]. An elementary school and 
additional residential development occurred in this area from 1953 through the 1960’s. 
Public health concerns and questions began to surface in 1976 including suggested health 
problems such as miscarriages, birth defects and cancer. National attention began to focus on the 
neighborhood of Love Canal. With the enactment of CERCLA in December 1980, the Love 
Canal site was placed on the National Priority List (NPL). The site has undergone remediation, 
which included soil excavation, on-site solidification, and on-site disposal including a low-
permeablity cover. 
The USEPA “delisted” Love Canal from the NPL in 2004. This decision states that the USEPA 
has determined that all appropriate response actions under CERCLA have been implemented and 
that no additional response actions are required [15]. 
Maxey Flats  
The Maxey Flats Disposal Site, was used for low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal from 
1963 until 1977 by the Nuclear Engineering Company [16]. Approximately 4.8 million cubic 
feet of LLW, containing over 2.4 million curies of radioactivity, was deposited into 52 unlined 
earthen trenches at this facility [17], 18].  
Operational problems began to arise in the early 1970’s [18]. Repeated subsidence problems with 
the surface cover had resulted in preferential infiltration routes through the cap. Contaminated 
leachate resulting from the burial trenches ultimately prompted the site’s closure in 1977 [19]. 
The Maxey Flats disposal site was placed on the NPL in 1986 [17]. The ROD was finalized in 
September 1991 [18]. The remedy included the solidification and on-site disposal of nearly a 
million gallons of contaminated leachate. A ‘natural stabilization’ remedy was also selected and 
implemented for the final remediation of Maxey Flats. This remedy required closure of the site, 
contouring of the site to reduce erosion and the subsequent capping of the site to prevent 
infiltration. The ‘interim’ geotextile cap, was completed in 2003 and covers approximately 60 
acres. The selected remedy further requires a 100-year ‘interim maintenance period’, which is to 
be followed by the ‘final site closure’ and a permanent ‘custodial maintenance’ phase. 
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Anaconda/Old Works 
The Anaconda/Old Works Smelter site was established in 1883 to process copper ore. Related 
operations continued at the site until 1980. In 1983, the USEPA placed the Anaconda site on the 
NPL, which initiated a series of site investigations. These investigations determined that the 
waste volumes associated with this site included approximately 230 million cubic yards of 
concentrated mine tailings, 30 million cubic yards of furnace slag, 500,000 cubic yards of flue 
dust, 20,000 acres of contaminated soil, and millions of gallons of contaminated groundwater. 
Human health risks resulting from the site are associated with five chemicals: arsenic, cadmium, 
lead, zinc, and copper [20]. 
The size and complexity of this site necessitated that it be subdivided into smaller, manageable 
Operable Units (OUs). One of the 15 OUs, the Old Works/East Anaconda Development Area 
(OW/EADA), was the primary focus of our research. The selected remedy for the OW/EADA 
OU requires both engineered and institutional controls. The remedial design also involved the 
economic revitalization of a portion of the impacted area. This re-use approach included the 
construction of a Jack Nicklaus Signature Golf Course on the OU. The Old Works Golf Course, 
which opened in 1997, incorporated innovative “irrigated mining caps” into its design, which 
supports the re-use of the property for recreational purposes [21], 22]. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
An analysis of the case studies investigated in this research illustrates variations used to isolate 
residual contaminants. While all three of these presented sites have an on-site CIF and use 
various institutional controls and engineered barriers to maintain isolation, which controls are 
used and how the controls are applied, tends to differ from site to site.  
For example, Love Canal and Maxey Flats can be described as sacrifice zones that are fenced off 
to prevent human access onto the property. Site security is actively maintained. At both of these 
sites the States have acquired title to the property. In the case of Love Canal, agents of the 
primary responsible party maintain access control. At Maxey Flats the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky maintains access control for the site. Conversely, Anaconda maintains a controlled re-
use potential and the landowner controls limited recreational access.  
Although both Love Canal and Maxey Flats are similar in that no re-use of the site is presently 
planned they differ in their designation of site completion. As previously mentioned, Love Canal 
has been delisted meaning no further remedial action is required. This “final” solution approach 
appears similar to other program approaches such as UMTRCA. Maxey Flats has designated its 
condition as an interim custodial maintenance period, which is projected to last for 100 years. 
This approach may require more active maintenance in the near-term but it may also offer a more 
flexible and adaptive management strategy.    
There are also notable differences with regard to stakeholder notification e.g., warning signs, 
Notice. At the Love Canal site the regulators have intentionally limited signage to contain 
emergency contacts only. This action was apparently taken to accommodate public concern 
regarding the notoriety of Love Canal. Conversely, the Maxey Flats site uses radiation-warning 
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signs to inform the public. The Anaconda site relies on No Trespassing signage although the site 
also tends to advertise its heritage and “rebirth” through poster displays and brochures. 
 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
A combination of selected controls is believed to offer increased protection against system 
failure. Through the application of multiple controls, the CIF is believed to be more robust and 
less likely to result in the re-exposure of receptors to the residual contaminants. This approach is 
often referred to as defense-in-depth or a layering of controls [1]. This research investigated this 
concept through the application of fault tree analysis (FTA). 
FTA is an analytical technique that describes the collection of events that must occur to explain a 
described state of a system. Fault trees are routinely used in reliability engineering [23], 24]. The 
FTA process is initiated by first defining an undesired state of the system. For the purposes of 
this research the undesired state of the system was described as Failure of Contaminant Isolation 
Facility Controls. An analysis of the details of the system was then performed to determine 
logical ways in which the undesired event could occur [23]. 
Figure 1 illustrates the high-level system Fault Tree for the Failure of Contaminant Isolation 
Facility Controls. This figure illustrates that CIFs consist of two subsystems, Institutional 
Controls and Engineered Barriers. These two subsystems are comprised of 13 individual controls, 
labeled A through M.  
These individual controls were further analyzed and most were found to be prone to failure e.g., 
single point errors. In other words a single implementation error could promulgate upward 
through the fault trees leading to control error. These errors could be latent errors resulting in no 
immediate adverse consequences but rather only become evident when combined with other 
factors [25].  
Fig. 1. High-level system Fault Tree for the Failure of Contaminant Isolation Facility Controls. 
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CONCLUSION 
Various system configurations are being applied for the near-surface isolation of residual 
contaminants for long-term periods. These configurations utilize a series of mechanisms to 
achieve the isolation objective. These individual controls including engineered barriers and 
institutional controls.  
Which controls are applied and how they are implemented varies from site to site. These 
variations appear intertwined with the site steward’s roles and responsibilities. Multi-
organizational involvement appears to be a routine component of CIF operations.  
If roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and multi-organizational collaboration is achieved, 
an improved monitoring approach can result. If responsibilities are unclear or if conflicting 
objectives are present, multi-organizational involvement will complicate CIF operations. 
Maintaining a site’s performance should include actively monitoring both the engineered barriers 
as well as the institutional controls. Monitoring should include self-monitoring by the site 
stewards as well as transparent third party monitoring by regulators, stakeholders, and the 
general public. 
FTA taxonomy is useful for organizing and analyzing institutional controls and engineered 
barriers. Fault trees provide a logical approach for clarifying how an undesired event (i.e. failure 
of the control) could occur and likewise, how mitigation efforts can reduce system failure. 
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